On the Avoidable War

I’m reviewing both this and The Avoidable War: Volume 1, Lord Cecil and the Policy of Principle, 1932-35 together, as it’s necessary to combine the two for a proper review.

In this work, J. Kenneth Brody surveys the transformation in the position of the Great Powers between 1932, where France and Britain experienced strong security, and 1936, where conditions in Europe appeared nearly apocalyptic to figure out “what went wrong,” and how it contributed to the Second World War.

It would be unfair to say that Brody puts the blame for the outbreak on the Second World War on the United Kingdom, but he does argue that Britain was nearly wholly at fault for the conditions that permitted the outbreak of the Second World War. While Lord Cecil is portrayed fairly admirably for his sense of principle here, his “Peace Ballot”—a non-binding referendum that showed most Brits were favor of both de-armament and intervention (above all through economics, but also through militarization) when one country invades another. As a result of the Peace Ballot, the British state was encouraged to take a hard-line with countries that violated the sovereignty of another (ironic, given that Britain’s empire spanned a quarter of the globe). However, the British state did not use this to bind Germany, but rather Italy, especially after its invasion of Ethiopia. To Brody, this course of action was a tragedy and Britain should have taken a much lighter hand with Italy in order to keep it in alliance with both Britain and France. Moreover, the British were unable to take France’s need for security seriously, and this led to misunderstandings between the two great powers.

Pierre Laval, on the other hand, is a man that Brody gives effusive praise to. In Brody’s view, Laval understood the need to coordinate action between the British and French, while bringing Italians into the fold. As a result, Laval had little qualm about acquiescing to Italian colonial interests, as long as the Italians were able to put up a united front with Britain and France (and, indirectly, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries) to encircle Germany, putting an end to German expansionism.

Italy, for its part, was the first to recognize the threat that Hitler represented, in Brody’s view. To him, Italy likely would have maintained its alliance with Britain and France had Britain not “betrayed” Mussolini’s country, thereby pushing him into alliance with Hitler. Given that Britain would not support France in defending the Rhineland from German militarization, there was little that France could do. Had the study extended a few more years, Brody likely would have crucified Britain further for its refusal to work closely with the Soviet Union, setting the stage for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

Had Britain acted as a responsible country in coalition with France and Italy, Brody argues that World War II could have been avoided. Is he right? I’m skeptical. This is a work of Realpolitik par excellence, so Brody opts to respond to principles and ideology with disdain (“In rejecting the Hoare-Laval pact, the British people put moral considerations, considerations of honor, above the national interest. History rarely records this as wise policy.”). In his study, he also neglects the fact that Britain and Italy were thoroughly at odds in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Mussolini sought to expand his new Roman Empire.

This is just a gripe, not a major criticism, but I hate the way that Brody discusses “France,” “Italy,” “Britain,” and “Germany” as monolithic wholes while personifying concepts like “history” (“history records . . .”).

As much as I disagree with Brody, this is a generally solid study. He’s a bit too soft on Laval and a bit too hard on a variety of British leaders (and the British people), but I think he’s mostly right on Italian foreign policy in western Europe (wholly ignoring Italian imperialist ambitions in southeastern Europe and Northern Africa). The groundwork for World War II cannot be laid wholly at the feet of Britain, as much as he would like us to see it this way.