On Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

This is a pretty basic overview of Italian foreign policy between the World Wars, but it’s a good overview and makes for a good reference for those looking to double-check it. Burgwyn argues here that there were a number of different “phases” to Italian foreign policy in these years. In the first phase, between 1919 and 1929, the Italian state very much followed in the footsteps of its liberal predecessors, although it also sought to revise the Treaty of Versailles to push forward its own interests. This was followed by the age of “peace,” which saw Dino Grandi as Italian Foreign Minister, and the aim here was traditional balance of power politics.

After the emergence of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the Italian state could take two directions: first, it could side with Britain and France and engage in balance-of-power politics; second, it could support Germany’s aims to crush the international order. In the first half of the 1930s, Mussolini generally directed the Italian state towards conciliatory attitudes with the UK and France. However, Italian policy transformed after 1935. First, it invaded Ethiopia in order to construct its African empire. Although it was heavily criticized by Britain and France, sanctions were largely useless. It maintained decent relations with both countries. After the invasion of Ethiopia, Mussolini began to support a more “ideological” foreign policy, shouting about liberal “plutocrats” in Western Europe and opposing Marxism much more heavily. As a result of this, Mussolini began to engage the Italian state in the Spanish Civil War, strengthening the Nationalists over the Republicans. And finally, although Mussolini saw the Anschluss in Austria as a tragedy, he found it better to support Germany over any liberal power in Europe. While Mussolini had little desire to go to war, he was dragged into it in 1940.

Above all, the attitudes held and choices made by Mussolini are most important to this study. Burgwyn rejects the idea of a “Fascist foreign policy” until 1935—most of the earlier period functioned more effectively in continuity with the liberal years. There’s some material missing here on other Italian colonies—in Burgwyn’s view, the “Italian Empire” did not really begin until it acquired Ethiopia, but it had already held Libya, Somalia, and Eritrea and all three must be discussed. Moreover, there is little here on Italian saber-rattling against other European colonies—especially in Tunisia, Egypt, and Palestine. All three are critical—there’s more than Europe in Italian foreign policy.

In spite of this, it’s worth taking a look at this and putting it in conversation with other works.