On the New Chinatown

As other reviewers have stated, this is a dated book, especially so because I read the first edition. Nevertheless, I was pulled into a story that I had no idea existed. Peter Kwong is particularly interested in the political-economic structure of Chinatowns in the United States, especially the New York Chinatown, and he pulls no punches. Enemy #1 for him is the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) which functions as a sort of traditionalist shadow-government.

The CCBA has its origins in rural social organization in 19th century China and, through 80 years of isolation (1881-1965) managed to transform itself in a modern context while solidifying its control. There are about 300 members within the CCBA for the New York Chinatown, and they required payments by those running businesses in New York (both within Chinatown and outside of them). They also demanded payments from those who were leaving the United States for China—payments that would be acquired by force, if necessary. The power of the CCBA was strengthened by receiving enormous amounts of patronage from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Guomindang/Kuomintang, KMT). American government officials generally looked the other way when the CCBA was active, and American officials and the CCBA developed strong connections throughout the 1950s, when the CCBA crusaded against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

At first glance, many Americans see the Chinese as a model minority, but this is in large part due to the role of CCBAs. He distinguishes between uptown Chinese (frequently the descendants of elites who left China in the wake of the 1949 Revolution) and downtown Chinese (who tend to consist of most others). Uptown Chinese have moved into Americans suburbs and participate in the professions, while downtown Chinese maintain ethnic communities. Downtown Chinese (best epitomized through the Chinatown) are often seen as a model minority due to enormous amounts of economic growth and low unemployment rate, but statistics only tell part of the story. There is low unemployment primarily because Chinatown economies function underground—crushing unions, ludicrously low wages, and 60+ working hours are the norm. This allows Chinese businesses to hire more people and bring down the unemployment rate. The economic successes here have inspired East Asian financiers to invest heavily in Chinatowns, which has led to skyrocketing property values and rents, while little of the spoils go to the average worker. Although Chinatowns are generally very successful, individual downtown Chinese residents outside of CCBA leaders ordinarily are not. This image is exacerbated by CCBA leaders, who tightly control reporting on conditions in Chinatowns while forcing residents to rely exclusively on Chinatown institutions without seeking legal recourse in American court (doing so can lead to the blackballing of individuals, or worse).

Then, there are the tongs, which are secret societies that emerged in the 17th century and played an important role in removing the position of the Ming. Tongs continue to play a role in extortion at the time the text was written, although little is known about them. They seem to have a lot in common to mafias or other gangs.

The whole book seems a bit conspiratorial to me, but Kwong doesn’t simply describe shadowy powers. He gives names and explains how exactly this functions—it makes it a bit more convincing to me, but I have trouble making sense of the strength that CCBA leaders have. I’m skeptical they were quite so powerful as Kwong argues, but I also don’t know enough to make a strong case otherwise.

Nevertheless, this is an interesting and (in my view) useful book for making sense of Chinatowns in the United States as late as 1990. In spite of his criticisms, Kwong is optimistic that the position of the CCBA is fragmenting, and I wonder how that has played out over the past thirty years.