On Tunisia

This is a goofy little book. Its intention is to assess the successes Tunisia was facing with modernization at the time of publication (1964) and look back into the past to find an explanation. One finding is that Tunisia’s modernizing success was political, not economic.

To explore the history leading up to modernization, the author puts forth a four step direction states take to modernize:

1. “First, there is a period of quiescence and gestation following the establishment of Western control. If any modernizing movement existed before Western domination, such a movement becomes for a time disorganized.” (4)

2. “A second stage follows in which a small elite, usually more an informal cultural association than a political party, consciously imitates the colonizer. The elite tends to see its mission as twofold—to prove to the colonizer that the native population is “civilizable” and to serve as the vanguard in showing the native population the way to “salvation.” But this elite faces an inherent dilemma: Its very reasonableness in this honeymoon period may win the prize of assimilation—but for the elite only, thus risking loss of identity with its own culture. If this danger is to be surmounted, the elite must attract popular support in the third stage.” (4)

3. “Even if this transition is accomplished smoothly, it involves making compromises on the ideological plane, for the leadership must trim its sails to appeal to the more conservative masses. In the third stage, with the formation of a mass movement, moderation vis-à-vis the colonizer is no longer possible. The impulse toward political agitation, extremism, and demagogy is matched by a tendency to assert native individuality, by a studied rejection of any and all colonial innovations—a sort of return to the womb.” (4)

4. “Out of this disequilibrium emerges a fourth, and usually final stage of the colonial situation. On the one hand, the major problems of old versus new, indigenous versus extraneous, and conservatism versus the idea of progress may be submerged in an all-out national struggle for independence. This might appear both logical and reasonable, but it actually means simply postponing consideration of problems that must eventually be faced. On the other hand, the difficult adjustment of new, alien ideas to the traditional, indigenous culture may be carried out at the same time as the struggle for national independence. This course may weaken the front against the colonizers and thus delay the attainment of independence, but it gains time for the alien ideas to be digested. The new state may thus come to independence with something approaching a new national ideology.”

To me, the biggest issue that the modernization of former colonial states must come from the colonial period, not the eras before or after. Micaud overstates the rigidity of Tunisian life during the Beylical period, essentially finding it static and unchanging. Yet, this is also the period where Ottoman control over Tunisia virtually disintegrated and autonomy was left in the hands of the Beys. Clearly, this wasn’t a multi-century period of staticity. The period after colonial rule is also crucial to modernization—the author accepts this, arguing that Tunisia is currently in the fourth stage, but he fails to recognize the weight of postcolonial decisions. Although not a Tunisian example, Qaddafi’s Libya is illustrative here, as Qaddafi broke entirely with the continuities between the colonial and Idrisi periods and forged a new Libya that would be unrecognizable to those living even in 1968.

I know these are two small examples, but Micaud’s model seems outright wrong to me, and I think these illustrate why.